Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reveals his hopes for the next president: ‘I like Joe Biden’

• Henry Kissinger is the most famous Secretary of State the US has had.
• Kissinger has acted as a foreign policy advisor to all US-presidents since John F. Kennedy.
• On Friday, he spoke with CEO of Axel Springer Mathias Döpfner to mark the end of the WELT Economic Summit in Paris.
• Kissinger revealed what he expected from the new president, the merits of the Trump administration, Realpolitik beyond hate, and his longing for harmony.
• Visit Business Insider’s homepage for more stories.

To this day, Henry Kissinger is the most famous Secretary of State the US has seen.

Born in Fürth in 1923, Kissinger is a Nobel Peace Prize winner and has acted as a foreign policy advisor to all US-presidents since John F. Kennedy.

On Friday, he spoke from New York with CEO of Axel Springer SE Mathias Döpfner to mark the end of the WELT Economic Summit in Paris.

Politicians and entrepreneurs from all over the globe joined in the conversation — from Capgemini’s CEO Aiman Ezzat and the CEO of Polish airline LOT Rafal Milczarski to CEO of Rewe Group Lionel Souque and the Editor-in-Chief and Managing Director of WELT Group, Ulf Poschardt.

Carried out on Friday, Joe Biden was the likely winner of the presidency at the time of this interview but his victory hadn’t yet been officially confirmed.

Speaking with Mathias Döpfner, Kissinger revealed what he expected from the new president, the merits of the Trump administration, Realpolitik beyond hate, and his longing for harmony.

Mathias Döpfner: How will this election impact the American people? And what does it mean for Europe, for transatlantic relations?

Henry Kissinger: The most important question this election has brought about is how the next President — whoever that may be — is to succeed in creating cohesion among the American people. As it stands, the losing party will claim that there were either procedural disputes or legal ones — disputes that our system allows us to take to court. Whatever the eventual outcome, the overarching challenge for whichever is the next administration will be to create some degree of unity.

Döpfner: How can this be achieved when we find ourselves in a political climate where the two parties are more diametrically opposed than ever?

Kissinger: Two of the main challenges for the next president will be, firstly, to establish whether the decision-making process is working properly and, secondly, whether it’s possible to put together an appropriately non-partisan cabinet.

Döpfner: How optimistic are you on that front?

Kissinger: I’m very hopeful this could be achieved in the near future. I’ve known Biden for decades. While I’ve disagreed with him on some political issues, he’s not trigger-happy when it comes to decision-making. The fundamental problems the US has on its hands are getting on top of grievances it has on its own soil and accepting that the pressing issues it faces can’t be resolved in the space of a single term. The American people will have to grapple with them indefinitely.

Döpfner: What do you expect in the field of foreign policy?

Kissinger: Relations with China are a major issue, and consist of two key components. The first is China’s growth, which naturally influences shifts in the balance of global power. Secondly, there are obviously ideological differences. The big question on the future of this situation is to what extent this ideological conflict will dictate the relationship between the two nations. The growth of the Chinese economy and its military forces is one thing, but those capabilities have changed in nature.

Döpfner: What do you mean?

Kissinger: Let’s take, for example, trade relations. Are negotiations even possible when tech giants are confronting each other over platforms with such global significance? Will there be a regular tendency to aim to crush their opponents? Or will it be possible for economic agreements to balance power and facilitate cross-border control of these platforms? These questions are of particular pertinence for the US and China. Without a doubt, there are technological developments taking place that will make military conflicts extremely difficult to contain.

Döpfner: How could this be avoided?

Kissinger: The world can’t afford to slip into a situation similar to that which it landed itself in ahead of World War I, where none of the countries that started the war in 1914 would have done so had they known what the world would look like in 1918. We need to consider the possibility of arms control. I belong to the now-minority that believes that it’s possible — indeed, imperative — to resolve serious conflict through negotiations. We can’t afford to continue to spiral. My message is of as much importance to China as it is to the US. I was born in Europe and spent much of my career in public service addressing European-American relations. Reconsideration of this issue is very important.

Döpfner: What is NATO’s role in all of this?

Kissinger: My political thinking took shape during the founding years of NATO, and when there was widespread fear of an ideological enemy. This attitude can no longer be reconciled with the current situation, in which the main challenges no longer arise principally at Europe’s borders. It’s imperative that Europe and the US find a common stance on Chinese-American relations. Where global balance is concerned, Europe embarking on a largely independent political course with China would be undesirable. It’s not in the interest of the future, for Europe to transform itself into some sort of continuation of Eurasia; it’s in the interests of both Europe and the US that the values they continue to share the values they have shared over centuries.

Döpfner: What steps and initiatives would you expect from Biden in the field of foreign policy?

Kissinger: If Biden emerges as President, it’s likely there will be another look at Iranian policy, particularly an attempt to make it applicable to an embracing Middle East approach. So, we are in America now before a very important period. I am hopeful that the problems that I have mentioned will be solved and that we will make progress. The US should be focused on the spirit of shared values and goals; it shouldn’t fixate on the triumph of one camp over another.

Döpfner: To what extent will US-European relations change with a new administration, purely on a stylistic and diplomatic level? Or conceptually? I refer to issues like addressing Islamic extremism, policy in the Middle East and China, and, more importantly for Europe, dealing with Russia and “Nord Stream II” or NATO’s budget. Some Europeans believe the new administration will bring about a new era of harmony and different approaches — is that belief naive? Or do you really expect a conceptual change? And, if so, what would that look like?

Kissinger: It would be a big mistake in Europe to prematurely assume that a change in presidency will mean the US will backpedal on everything Europeans have been angsting over. We have to mentally divorce the methods used by the departing administration from the actual questions it’s raised — including, in particular, how Europe is contributing to achieving world order. If we have a new president, the incoming administration will analyze which of the disagreements between Europe and the US were disputes over method rather than the issue at hand. We shouldn’t make the mistake of taking harmony as granted. Significant dialogue is required for harmony, both in Europe and in the US.

Döpfner: I was surprised on election night to see an interview Bild TV did with our Foreign Minister Heiko Maas. He was quizzed on a number of foreign policy decisions and achievements of the incoming US government, including questions on policy with regards to the Middle East and China. He took a lot of viewers by surprise — he basically agreed with most of the foreign policy priorities and decisions the US government has made. What’s your take on the last four years under the Trump administration? Was it simply a democratic accident or do you think there have been any lasting successes with regard to world order?

Kissinger: A number of the issues that the Trump administration raised were serious. Economic relations between China and the United States have become increasingly one-sided. So it was right to say clearly that the transfer of technology and the negotiation of trade agreements couldn’t go on indefinitely. This made it clear at a diplomatic level that both sides had to think about their limits and goals.

The question now is, can one attempt to appreciate how imperative it is not to hop from one confrontation to the next? China and the West need to establish positive goals in their relations and must give up the rhetoric of containment.

Another success of the Trump administration was to draw attention to the need for Europe to break out of the passive habit it had fallen into. Relations between the US and Europe would have to adjust to the circumstances that were just taking shape.

 

Döpfner: Once again, what role should NATO play in this context?

Kissinger: So far, NATO has and should continue to provide the basic framework for transatlantic relations. However, NATO should shift from a purely military alliance into one that continues to have a strong military focus that also accounts for growing global upheavals that aren’t just military — challenges that require political sensitivity. I would say to my European friends that we need their intellectual and emotional commitment to a new vision of the world. They would be wise to look at it not simply from the point of view of their grievances but with an eye toward the objectives we can work on together.

Aiman Ezzat: Is the shift of attention in American foreign policy to Asia and particularly China going to reduce the importance of Europe?

Kissinger: It will, of course, have an impact on the importance of Europe, as there are other issues that will now have to be addressed. The importance of Europe needs to be redefined in a new, substantive, and even liturgical way if European-American relations are to develop a new sense of direction. We have to resist the temptation of playing off one side of the Atlantic against the other when reconsidering policy around China. This reassessment must be based on a European willingness to play a bigger global role for the first time.

Rafael Milczarski: I’d like to ask a short, slightly more personal question: you are the architect of one of the most fundamental shifts in the opening up to China. Would you have done anything differently looking back? And what else could have been done differently by others? I think the outcome we see today is perhaps not what we’d been hoping for when the process started taking place.

Kissinger: Well, if you look at the development of this relationship, there were a number of different phases. When the relationship opened up, neither Nixon nor I believed that Chinese ideology would inevitably change as a result of this development. At the time, our primary strategic goal was to integrate China into the Cold War with the Soviet Union and to broaden the perspective of our own people and that of our allies beyond the horizons of existing colonial conflicts.

The fundamental technological change began after China became a member of the World Trade Organization. At the time, the strategic implications weren’t really considered. Would it have been possible to have an earlier overview of the strategic implications and their scope? Probably. But that wouldn’t have changed the fundamental problem: the existence of different cultural traditions that are now increasingly clashing. Will it be possible to avoid what Europeans failed to do before the outbreak of the First World War? Will it be possible to establish principles for peaceful coexistence? Or are our countries doomed to permanent conflict with one another?

Of course, it won’t be easy to move from conflict to peaceful coexistence and harmony. But using modern technology to position yourself in a state of permanent confrontation seems extremely unreasonable. Should a different policy have been pursued 50 years ago? In my opinion, opening up to China has been an essential contribution to the reorganization of the world. The success of this policy has now brought us to a point where we need to readjust this direction on both sides. This isn’t a matter that either side can handle alone. What’s required is the historical perspective of the West and a comparable understanding on the Chinese side, that adapts their cultural proclivities to the modern conditions in which there can be no pre-eminent countries and no inherently tributary states in the international system.

Lionel Souque: What is your personal opinion about Joe Biden?

Kissinger: I’ve known Mr. Biden for over 40 years. You may find it amusing that he wasn’t actually 30 when he was first elected Senator, which is the minimum age required by the constitution. During one of my tenures as Secretary of State, he attended a high-level meeting of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. So he’s coming in and I didn’t know who he was. I said, “I didn’t know staff members were allowed to attend this meeting.” Biden didn’t make a big fuss about this at the time. Over the years he has told this story I don’t know how many times. I like him as a person. We often disagreed on foreign policy, but if he becomes president, I’m convinced he will be moderate and thoughtful in his foreign policy.

Very capable foreign policy advisers stood by him during the election campaign. What will happen in the post-election period isn’t entirely clear, but I will use my leverage, albeit small, to promote the unity of the nation.

Ulf Poschardt: Some in Europe have been saying that America is increasingly withdrawing its attention away from Europe. They believe Europe should become more self-confident and should be a strong global player in foreign policy and economic innovation. Do you see that happening?

Kissinger: I would love to see Europe play a stronger historical role, that is, with greater confidence in its own global political role. I would be concerned if this were done in opposition to the United States. And I hope that Europe will fulfill its global role in such a way that there is a marked parallel between American and European thinking. I think it would be bad if Europe degenerated intellectually into a kind of appendage of Eurasia. So, there’s a challenge on both sides of the Atlantic to revitalize mutual relations.

Poschardt: You were born in Franconian Fürth 97 years ago — Bavaria’s prime minister Markus Söder was born in Franconian Nuremberg and could become German chancellor next year. What are your thoughts on him?

Kissinger: Being Franconian myself, it follows that I’d have an interest in a fellow Franconian. My Franconian accent speaking with a Franconian accent in two languages, but I have not met Markus Söder, but I will follow him just as I do SpVgg Fürth.

Döpfner: For decades, you followed your soccer team SpVgg Fürth using German Embassy wires in Washington. Digital media now does this all much better — and in realtime. If we look at the media’s role during the last election and the campaign — not just the polling institutes; from media based in New York and Paris to Berlin — they were all off by quite a long way. Is this demonstrative of a fundamental rift between the media and the public, that is, a lack of trust in the media? The second question is thinking a little further ahead: when you celebrate your 107th birthday, what do you think democracy will look like? Will Western democracy be stronger through improvements brought on by the crisis? Or do you think we’re facing a serious and fundamental democratic crisis?

Kissinger: The media was very emotional in the way they followed this election. It was very difficult, near impossible, to give an objective account of what was going on to a degree that was unsettling. They weren’t lying, as in, it wasn’t the case that the media knew one thing and would report something else; I think it was rather that media outlets had convinced themselves the trend was in a certain direction when it turned out not to be. That was the case even among pollsters. The US media – I didn’t follow European outlets as closely – ought to ask themselves how they got there.

And now, as for the “crisis of democracy”— is there one? There’s a perception crisis that comes about when it becomes too hard for the average person to follow the complexities of, say, technological development in the field of AI and the interaction of states. It’s becoming possible to live in a world in which machines perform so many basic tasks that the philosophical basis for clever use of technology is overtaken by the rapid progress of technological innovation itself.

Marketing techniques have become so sophisticated — they’re now essentially an art form — that the ability to influence the public is no longer proportionate to its ability to understand how, precisely, it’s being influenced.

So are we doomed to a future of authoritarianism? The invention of the printing press had an immense impact on the way humans think and ultimately led to the Enlightenment. But during the Enlightenment, in addition to new technology, there were also great philosophers who grappled with the central problems of their time. 

I think all societies need to find a way of balancing our extraordinary technological feats with some reflection about our goals. That’s one of the fundamental challenges of democracy.

And Europe will have an important role in the intellectual evolution of technology. But anyone who’s lived in a dictatorship, as I have, and who has seen the inherent weakness of dictatorships, must support a democratic outcome as the ultimate goal.

The second question here is: when dealing with major nations, to what extent should foreign policy enforce a preference for democracy? The preference for it has to be clear but it should leave scope for adjustments in each society, even if the hope is that the outcome will be a democratic one.