From Khan v. Hasan, decided Wednesday by the New York intermediate appellate court (Judges Angela G. Iannacci, Cheryl E. Chambers, William G. Ford & Lillian Wan), a good illustration of how American law generally treats religious agreements:
The parties were married in a civil ceremony on March 2, 2016, and subsequently held a religious ceremony on September 12, 2016. The parties’ religious certificate of marriage, which was signed by two witnesses and an imam, but was not acknowledged, lists an amount of $50,000 for “Meher.” The parties assert that a Meher or Mahr agreement is an agreement between the parties to a marriage, in accordance with Islamic law, that the husband will pay to the wife a specified sum in the event of a divorce.
The parties eventually divorced, and the husband sought to set aside the Mahr; the court agreed:
“It is without question that when courts must touch upon questions of religious concerns, they may not consider religious doctrine.” “[H]owever, the [United States] Supreme Court, in holding that a State may adopt any approach to resolving religious disputes which does not entail consideration of doctrinal matters, specifically approved the use of the neutral principles of law approach as consistent with constitutional limitations. This approach contemplates the application of objective, well-established principles of secular law to the dispute, thus permitting judicial involvement to the extent that it can be accomplished in purely secular terms.”
Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(3) states that “[a]n agreement by the parties, made before or during the marriage, shall be valid and enforceable in a matrimonial action if such agreement is in writing, subscribed by the parties, and acknowledged or proven in the manner required to entitle a deed to be recorded.” “[A]n unacknowledged agreement is invalid and unenforceable in a matrimonial action.”
Here, pursuant to the neutral principles of law approach, the Supreme Court properly determined that the Mahr agreement was unenforceable for lack of proper acknowledgment, as it would be improper and unconstitutional to treat a Mahr agreement differently than other religious or nonreligious nuptial agreements in terms of procedural requirements….
Seems quite right to me. That the agreement was pursuant to Islamic law neither keeps it from being enforced when it’s valid under state law, nor allows it to be enforced when it’s invalid under state law. (Agreements that include religious terms that require religious interpretation are unenforceable by secular courts on those grounds, but here the problem was different.) For more, see my Religious Law (Especially Islamic Law) in American Courts.
David W. Teeter represents the husband.
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