Just released, and available here. I haven’t read it yet, but I thought I’d pass it along. [UPDATE: I’m updating this post to add key excerpts of the opinion, as I read it.]
To summarize our First Amendment analysis: The Government has provided two national security justifications for the Act. We assumed without deciding the Act is subject to strict scrutiny and we now uphold the TikTok-specific portions of the Act under each justification. This conclusion is supported by ample evidence that the Act is the least restrictive means of advancing the Government’s compelling national security interests….
[T]he Government offers two national security justifications for the Act: to counter (1) the PRC’s efforts to collect data of and about persons in the United States, and (2) the risk of the PRC covertly manipulating content on TikTok. Each constitutes an independently compelling national security interest.
In reaching that conclusion, we follow the Supreme Court in affording great weight to the Government’s “evaluation of the facts” because the Act “implicates sensitive and weighty interests of national security and foreign affairs.” At the same time, of course, we “do not defer to the Government’s reading of the First Amendment.” We simply recognize the comparatively limited competence of courts at “collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in this area.” With regard to national security issues, the political branches may — and often must — base their actions on their “informed judgment,” which “affects what we may reasonably insist on from the Government.” …
We … reject TikTok’s argument that the Government’s data-related concerns are speculative. The Government “need not wait for a risk to materialize” before acting; its national security decisions often must be “based on informed judgment.” Here the Government has drawn reasonable inferences based upon the evidence it has. That evidence includes attempts by the PRC to collect data on U.S. persons by leveraging Chinese-company investments and partnerships with U.S. organizations. It also includes the recent disclosure by former TikTok employees that TikTok employees “share U.S. user data on PRC-based internal communications systems that China-based ByteDance employees can access,” and that the ByteDance subsidiary responsible for operating the platform in the United States “approved sending U.S. data to China several times.” In short, the Government’s concerns are well founded, not speculative….
Preventing covert content manipulation by an adversary nation also serves a compelling governmental interest. The petitioners object for two reasons, neither of which persuades. First, TikTok incorrectly frames the Government’s justification as suppressing propaganda and misinformation. The Government’s justification in fact concerns the risk of the PRC covertly manipulating content on the platform. For that
reason, again, the Act is directed only at control of TikTok by a foreign adversary nation.At points, TikTok also suggests the Government does not have a legitimate interest in countering covert content manipulation by the PRC. To the extent that is TikTok’s argument, it is profoundly mistaken. “At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal.” When a government — domestic or foreign — “stifles speech on account of its message … [it] contravenes this essential right” and may “manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion.”
In this case, a foreign government threatens to distort free speech on an important medium of communication. Using its hybrid commercial strategy, the PRC has positioned itself to manipulate public discourse on TikTok in order to serve its own ends. The PRC’s ability to do so is at odds with free speech fundamentals. Indeed, the First Amendment precludes a domestic government from exercising comparable control over a social media company in the United States. Here the Congress, as the Executive proposed, acted to end the PRC’s ability to control TikTok. Understood in that way, the Act actually vindicates the values that undergird the First Amendment….
Rather than attempting itself to influence the content that appears on a substantial medium of communication, the Government has acted solely to prevent a foreign adversary from doing so. As our concurring colleague explains, this approach follows the Government’s well-established practice of placing restrictions on foreign ownership or control where it could have national security implications….
TikTok contends the Government’s content-manipulation rationale is speculative and based upon factual errors. TikTok fails, however, to grapple fully with the Government’s submissions. On the one hand, the Government acknowledges that it lacks specific intelligence that shows the PRC has in the past or is now coercing TikTok into manipulating content in the United States. On the other hand, the Government is aware “that ByteDance and TikTok Global have taken action in response to PRC demands to censor content outside of China.” The Government concludes that ByteDance and its TikTok entities “have a demonstrated history of manipulating the content on their platforms, including at the direction of the PRC.” Notably, TikTok never squarely denies that it has ever manipulated content on the TikTok platform at
the direction of the PRC. Its silence on this point is striking given that “the Intelligence Community’s concern is grounded in the actions ByteDance and TikTok have already taken overseas.” It may be that the PRC has not yet done so in the United States or, as the Government suggests, the Government’s lack of evidence to that effect may simply reflect limitations on its ability to monitor TikTok.In any event, the Government reasonably predicts that TikTok “would try to comply if the PRC asked for specific actions to be taken to manipulate content for censorship, propaganda, or other malign purposes” in the United States. That conclusion rests on more than mere speculation. It is the Government’s “informed judgment” to which we give great weight in this context, even in the absence of “concrete evidence” on the likelihood of PRC-directed censorship of TikTok in the United States….
We recognize that this decision has significant implications for TikTok and its users. Unless TikTok executes a qualified divestiture by January 19, 2025 — or the President grants a 90-day extension based upon progress towards a qualified divestiture, § 2(a)(3) — its platform will effectively be unavailable in the United States, at least for a time. Consequently, TikTok’s millions of users will need to find alternative media of communication. That burden is attributable to the PRC’s hybrid commercial threat to U.S. national security, not to the U.S. Government, which engaged with TikTok through a multi-year process in an effort to find an alternative solution.
The First Amendment exists to protect free speech in the United States. Here the Government acted solely to protect that freedom from a foreign adversary nation and to limit that adversary’s ability to gather data on people in the United States.
The opinion is by Judge Douglas Ginsburg, joined by Judge Neomi Rao; Chief Judge Srinivasan concurs in part and in the judgment, with a separate opinion:
I fully join all aspects of the court’s opinion today other than Part II.B, which rejects TikTok’s First Amendment challenge. As to that challenge, I agree with my colleagues that the Act does not violate the First Amendment. But I reach that conclusion via an alternate path. My colleagues do not decide whether the Act should be subjected to the strictest First Amendment scrutiny or instead the lesser standard of intermediate scrutiny because, in their view, the Act satisfies strict scrutiny regardless. I see no need to decide whether the Act can survive strict scrutiny, because, in my view, the Act need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny, which it does. I would thus answer the question my colleagues leave open while leaving open the question they answer.
Two features of the Act support applying intermediate rather than strict scrutiny to resolve TikTok’s First Amendment challenge. First, in step with longstanding restrictions on foreign control of mass communications channels, the activity centrally addressed by the Act’s divestment mandate is that of a foreign nation rather than a domestic speaker—indeed, not just a foreign nation but a designated foreign adversary.
Second, the Act mandates divestment of that foreign adversary’s control over TikTok for reasons lying outside the First Amendment’s heartland: one reason that is wholly unrelated to speech, and another that, while connected to speech, does not target communication of any specific message, viewpoint, or content.
In those circumstances, the Act’s divestment mandate need not be the least restrictive means of achieving its nationalsecurity objectives, as strict scrutiny would require. Rather, it is enough if, per intermediate scrutiny, the divestment mandate is not substantially broader than necessary to meet those goals. The Act meets that standard.
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