In Doe v. Jeancharles (M.D. Fla.), Doe is suing “alleging violations of the federal Trafficking Victims’ Protection Reauthorization Act (‘TVPRA’), violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (‘FLSA’), breach of contract,” and related theories. The Complaint alleges that:
Dr. Jean-Charles targeted desperate and vulnerable Immigrant Medical Graduates (“IMG”), he lured them to work for JC Medical Center with the promise of compensation, experience, and a recommendation letter to help them “match” a residency program, he withheld payment or underpaid these vulnerable IMG’s [including Doe], and has coerced them to work full-time hours seeing scores of patients.
But yesterday’s decision by Magistrate Judge Robert Norway (M.D. Fla.) concludes that Doe had to sue under his own name:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires that “every pleading” in federal court “name all the parties.” This rule “protects the public’s legitimate interest in knowing all of the facts involved, including the identities of the parties.” … A party may proceed anonymously or pseudonymously by establishing “a substantial privacy right which outweighs the ‘customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.'” … The Eleventh Circuit has found that the “first step” [in this analysis] is to consider the three factors analyzed in Southern Methodist University Association of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe (5th Cir. 1979): “whether the party seeking anonymity (1) is challenging government activity; (2) would be compelled, absent anonymity, to disclose information of utmost intimacy; or (3) would be compelled, absent anonymity, to admit an intent to engage in illegal conduct and thus risk criminal prosecution.”
Along with the SMU factors, the court should “carefully review all the circumstances of a given case and then decide whether the customary practice of disclosing the plaintiff’s identity should yield to the plaintiff’s privacy concerns.” For example, the court may also consider “whether the plaintiffs were minors, whether they were threatened with violence or physical harm by proceeding in their own names, and whether their anonymity posed a unique threat of fundamental unfairness to the defendant.” …
Starting with the first step of considering the SMU factors, Plaintiff relies on the third factor that he would be compelled to admit an intent to engage in illegal conduct and risk criminal prosecution as his substantial privacy interest. Plaintiff contends that he may have violated Florida Statutes sections 456.065 and 817.234, which make it a felony under certain circumstances to practice medicine without a license and participate in insurance fraud. But Plaintiff has failed to cite any case law that advances his position or provide information that indicates any pending criminal prosecution or allegations of forthcoming charges. Without more, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff has established a substantial privacy right that outweighs the presumption of open court proceedings. See Doe v. Florida Gulf Coast Univ. Bd. of Trustees (M.D. Fla. 2023) (denying motion to proceed anonymously where plaintiff did not allege that criminal charges were forthcoming or indicate pending criminal prosecution).
Further, Plaintiff is not challenging the Florida Statutes he believes he may have violated—the potential criminal conduct alleged here is tangential to the case. Courts have found the compelled to admit an intent to engage in illegal conduct factor in favor of plaintiffs where the plaintiffs are challenging the validity of the law for which they have violated or intend to violate. Thus, the Court finds that the third SMU factor does not weigh in favor of Plaintiff….
Plaintiff states that it will cause him great embarrassment and humiliation to proceed under his name because he is an alleged victim of labor trafficking and that he fears retaliation from Defendant in the form of reputational harm. But Plaintiff again fails to provide any case law to support his position that his circumstances establish a substantial privacy right. Plaintiff simply offers more factual background about Defendant’s alleged wrongdoing and how he believes Defendant will smear his reputation in the medical community because this action will expose Defendant. While the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s situation and concerns, fear of embarrassment, humiliation, and retaliation is insufficient to outweigh the interest in proceeding publicly…. “… ‘[P]ersonal embarrassment’ alone is not enough for leave to proceed anonymously.” …
In sum, Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing a substantial privacy right that overcomes the presumption of judicial openness. The Court understands that Plaintiff has alleged unfortunate circumstances and reasonable fears, but the Court finds that this matter does not rise to the type of exceptional case needed to proceed pseudonymously.… “Lawsuits are public events. A plaintiff should be permitted to proceed anonymously only in those exceptional cases involving matters of a highly sensitive and personal nature, real danger of physical harm, or where the injury litigated against would be incurred as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff’s identity.” …
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