From People v. Stanley, decided Sept. 10 by the Office of Presiding Disciplinary Judge of the Supreme Court of Colorado but just posted to Westlaw; the opinion is by Presiding Disciplinary Judge Bryon M. Large, joined in part by Member Sherry A. Caloia (a lawyer) and in part by Member Melinda M. Harper (a citizen member):
Following the highly publicized disappearance of a Chaffee County woman [Suzanne Morphew], Stanley, who was the newly elected District Attorney of Colorado’s 11th Judicial District, brought first-degree murder charges against the woman’s spouse [Barry Morphew]. During the prosecution, Stanley made three improper extrajudicial statements about the case to the media, which threatened to prejudice the defendant and undermine the public’s interest in justice. Those statements contributed in part to a judicial ruling changing venue in the case. Through this misconduct, Stanley violated Colo. RPC 3.6(a) (a lawyer who participates in the investigation or litigation of a matter must not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding) and Colo. RPC 3.8(f) (prosecutors must refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused unless the comments serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s action, or are permitted under Colo. RPC 3.6(b)).
At the same time, Stanley did not adequately supervise the prosecution of the case. She failed to timely direct adequate administrative resources to process discovery, leading to a series of judicially imposed sanctions against the prosecution for discovery violations. She failed to take reasonable measures to establish a leadership structure that ensured accountability within the prosecution team, with the result that the prosecution team overlooked important projects in the case. And she failed to intervene when the prosecution team was given an opportunity to cure its deficient endorsements for expert witnesses, the majority of whom were eventually excluded. Through this conduct, Stanley violated Colo. RPC 5.1(b) (a lawyer with direct supervisory authority over another lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct).
After the presiding judge [Ramsey Lama] issued several adverse rulings less than two months before jury selection, Stanley instructed her chief investigator to interview the judge’s former spouse to determine whether the judge committed domestic abuse. Even though she had no credible evidence to believe that the judge had ever engaged in such criminal conduct, Stanley ordered the investigation in an effort to uncover information about the judge that would require him to recuse from the case. Shortly after the interview, which revealed that the judge had never abused his former spouse, Stanley dismissed the case without prejudice. Though this conduct, Stanley attempted to violate Colo. RPC 8.4(d) (it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), thereby contravening Colo. RPC 8.4(a) (it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct).
In a bid to rehabilitate her relationship with the media, Stanley later agreed to sit for a videotaped interview with a local reporter. During that interview, which Stanley reasonably should have known was on the record and would be publicly disseminated, she again made improper extrajudicial statements about two defendants criminally charged in the death of a ten-month-old baby.
She effectively pronounced that one of the defendants was guilty, revealed inadmissible details about the defendant’s sexually based juvenile offenses, and impugned the motives and character of the defendants. Two judicial officers, ruling independently, concluded that Stanley’s extrajudicial statements amounted to outrageous government conduct so severely prejudicing the defendants that the judiciary was required to dismiss each defendant’s criminal case. Through this conduct, Stanley violated Colo. RPC 3.6(a) and Colo. RPC 3.8(f)….
In their opening statement, the People likened Respondent’s handling of the Morphew prosecution to that of a ship’s captain who never appeared on the bridge. In some ways, this analogy is apt. Respondent’s absence at the helm during key phases of the prosecution—even when she was warned that it faced rough waters—led to a series of events that ended with the first-degree murder case running aground.
The analogy captures Respondent’s dereliction of her duty as an elected official and the top prosecutor in her district. In that role, her obligation was not to win or to protect her reputation but to see justice done. Instead, her unjustifiable extrajudicial statements in the Jacobs and Crawford cases led to the opposite result, prejudicing each criminal defendant and torpedoing the criminal cases against them. And her baseless decision to launch an in-house investigation of a judge presiding over a case that was close to trial prejudiced the administration of justice and abused her position of trust. She must be disbarred.
This is just the introduction and the conclusion; the full opinion goes into much more detail. Member Caloia dissented in part:
I would be remiss if I did not set forth the particularities of practicing criminal law in a small rural jurisdiction and the accepted practices of criminal lawyers and district attorneys. The problems that exist with respect to providing discovery to defendants in a criminal case in Colorado are many and widespread. The practice of responding to motions and filing expert witness reports varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and judge to judge. I am concerned that the Morphew case has undergone an extensive amount of Monday-morning quarterbacking. Practices common to a civil arena are not always common to a criminal case. There are various accepted practices and discovery issues that are particular to criminal law that need to be considered….
I also dissent as to the majority’s finding as to [the interview of Judge Lama’s wife]…. Here, the majority concludes the People have not proved that Respondent’s decision to interview Iris Lama either prejudiced or attempted to prejudice the administration of justice. Respondent’s decision to seek an interview with Iris Lama had some grounding—most specifically, Judge Lama’s decision to exclude evidence of domestic violence in the Morphew case. That, coupled with Iris Lama’s position with the Alliance Against Domestic Abuse and her public advocacy for missing people, including Suzanne Morphew, was sufficient to justify exercise of Respondent’s sweeping discretion to look into the change.org petition’s allegations.
I am even more influenced by the manner in which Respondent chose to inquire into potential judicial bias. Though best practices would dictate that an outside agency conduct the interview, Respondent did solicit help from the Chaffee County Sheriff and the CBI; both agencies declined to participate. After settling on Corey to interview Iris Lama, Respondent took reasonable steps to ensure that the interview was both voluntary and entirely confidential. Corey met on Iris Lama’s terms, wore civilian clothes, and conducted the interview in a conversational, low-pressure way. The prosecution took no further investigative action. As I see it, the interview was something short of a criminal investigation and did not clearly evince an attempt to prejudice the administration of justice. Further, because Respondent did not make public the allegations or the fact of the interview, I assess the risk as rather low that the interview took on the appearance of harassment, intimidation, or retaliation. Ultimately, the case was dismissed shortly after the interview, so no prejudice to the justice system accrued.
I conclude that Respondent’s decision to interview Iris Lama was within the bounds of Respondent’s prosecutorial discretion. In making this determination, I am particularly mindful that an opposite conclusion could send the message that prosecutors are prohibited from merely asking citizens questions about intimations of wrongdoing. Had Respondent gone further—if, for example, she had made Judge Lama aware of the interview, approached him for an interview, taken other additional actions, or more conspicuously invoked the authority of her office—I would find differently. But under these specific circumstances, I cannot conclude the People have proved that Respondent prejudiced or attempted to prejudice the administration of justice….
Finally, I dissent as to the appropriate sanction in this case. I believe that Respondent should not be disbarred but instead should be suspended for a period of two and a half years, with the requirement that before she returns to the practice of law she must prove she can practice law in conformity with the Rules of Professional Conduct….
Member Harper dissented in part as to a different matter: She would have also found that DA Stanley had “failed to exercise reasonable diligence in prosecuting the Morphew case.” Judge Large’s opinion was thus a majority opining for the panel, though different members joined different parts.
The majority opinion also discusses DA Stanley’s background; had her behavior in these cases been different, her personal might have been inspiring:
Respondent grew up in Davenport, Iowa. After receiving an associate’s degree in criminal justice, she moved to Colorado in 1989 and worked as a truck driver. In 1993, she obtained a bachelor’s degree at Metro State University in criminal justice. Later, she served as a police officer for several years, first in Arvada and then in Blackhawk. Before starting her family, Respondent returned to driving semis, which paid more and which she adjudged was less dangerous. She had two boys, who are now grown. Eventually, she attended the University of Denver master’s degree program in public administration with an emphasis in domestic violence prevention, an issue personal to her, having been a victim of domestic violence. In autumn 2006 she enrolled at University of Denver law school in the part-time evening program, with the goal of working as a prosecutor. She graduated from law school in May 2010.
Respondent was admitted to practice law in Colorado in 2012. She has worked as prosecutor for most of her legal career in municipal, county, and district courts. In 2017, she briefly worked in private practice before accepting employment as a hearing officer for the Colorado Department of Revenue. She left that position in January 2020 to campaign for the position of district attorney …. She testified that she ran in part on a platform of prioritizing cold cases. She won the election ….
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