In Judge Wendy Beetlestone’s opinion today in León v. Hanoch, the parties were attorney coworkers; León had been sexually involved with Hanoch’s friend Goodman, who was also a coworker. “Throughout the relationship, Goodman told Hanoch that León was stalking, threatening, and harassing her; that he was hazing her at work; and, that she was scared for her safety.” Here’s the court’s summary of the facts and procedural history:
The instant lawsuit is based on events that occurred after the three spent a night barhopping in Philadelphia. As the night began to wind down, Goodman left the bar, telling her friends that she would order an Uber home. León followed, and Goodman texted Hanoch that she was trying to “get away” from him. Hanoch pursued them both, at one point running across the street, against traffic. During her pursuit, Goodman called Hanoch, crying, and reiterated that León was chasing her down the street.
Once Hanoch caught up to León and Goodman near Philadelphia City Hall, she saw León’s hands outstretched towards Goodman as if he was trying to get hold of her while Goodman was “cowering away” from León. She also saw that Goodman was “sobbing, her make-up was streaked everywhere.” Nearby—positioned catty-corner to Goodman and León— Hanoch noticed two police officers inside their squad car. She approached them and told them that she thought Goodman was being sexually assaulted.
When the officers did not engage with the situation, Hanoch spun around and inserted herself between Goodman and León, yelling at León while she did so. Although in her deposition she testified that she did not remember exactly what she said at the time, the parties agree that Hanoch said something like “Get away from her. Don’t ever touch her again. I’ll kill you if you ever come near her.” {In his Complaint, León alleged that Hanoch struck him during the confrontation as well but brought only an assault claim against Hanoch, not a battery claim.}
That evening spurred a handful of legal proceedings. Goodman and Hanoch filed a complaint with the New Jersey State Bar, alleging that León had assaulted Goodman. Goodman also filed a petition for a Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) order in Delaware Family Court. That petition was referred to a Commissioner of the Delaware Family Court, and the Commissioner issued a 52-page order making a series of factual findings supporting the conclusion that León had abused Goodman. As a result, the Commissioner granted Goodman’s petition. León appealed, but the PFA order was affirmed in its entirety….
León sued, among other things for assault, but the court concluded that claim was precluded by the defense-of-others defense, which applies—both in civil and criminal cases—when “the defendant [reasonably] believes that … another is in imminent danger of bodily harm” (cleaned up):
The undisputed facts … confirm that Hanoch subjectively believed that Goodman was in danger of imminent bodily harm. The record now includes Hanoch’s testimony that she believed as much, and León does not offer any evidence to the contrary, nor in his briefing does he attempt to argue that the subjective element is not met….
As for the objective element, as previously determined and now confirmed by the record, the undisputed facts are that Hanoch held a reasonable belief that León posed a threat of imminent bodily harm to Goodman. It is undisputed that: Goodman had previously told Hanoch that León was harassing her (which a Delaware court found to be true); Goodman both texted and called Hanoch, alerting her that she was fleeing León’s pursuit; Hanoch witnessed Goodman crying, with her makeup streaking down her face, apparently trying to get away from León; and, León had his arms outstretched in what appeared to be an attempt to grab hold of Goodman when Hanoch arrived on the scene. Together, those facts would lead a reasonable person to believe that Goodman was in danger ….
León does not dispute any of those facts, but he does argue that Hanoch’s belief that Goodman was in danger was unreasonable because: two police officers were nearby; Hanoch did not see León touch Goodman; both Goodman and León were clothed when Hanoch caught up to them; and, León immediately left the scene after his confrontation with Hanoch…. [But] León’s departure from the scene after Goodman’s purported assault says nothing about whether her belief that he posed a threat to Goodman was objectively reasonable at the time she purportedly assaulted him. Similarly, whether León had yet to touch Goodman or whether the two were clothed does not render Hanoch’s belief that Goodman was in danger unreasonable.
The defense-of-others inquiry considers “all the circumstances known to” the defendant. Hanoch’s knowledge of León’s abusive relationship with Goodman, her understanding that León had been in pursuit of Goodman through Center City Philadelphia while Goodman attempted to escape, and her witnessing Goodman in a state of obvious distress, which are all facts that León does not dispute, suffice to establish an objectively reasonable belief that Goodman was in danger.
And the court held that the defendant could recover her attorney fees and other litigation costs:
In Pennsylvania, when a defendant “uses force … in the protection of other persons” and “prevails in a civil action,” “the court shall award reasonable expenses to the” defendant. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8340.2(a)(1)-(2), (b). Based on that cost-shifting provision, Hanoch requests an additional fourteen days to submit a petition under the statute detailing “attorney fees, expert witness fees, court costs and compensation for loss of income.” Id. at § 8340.2(b).
León argues that the cost-shifting statute does not apply, because he has not brought a battery claim, so there is no use of force at issue here. León cites no case to support such a narrow reading of the statute, and construing the statute so narrowly would lead to absurd results. To read the statute as León sees it would incentivize more violence: someone who commits a battery to defend another would be entitled to reasonable expenses, but someone who commits an assault in defense of others would not.
In any event, the statute straightforwardly applies when self-defense and defense-of- others justifications are established, and self-defense (and therefore, by extension, defense-of-others) as a justification is just as available in assault cases as in battery ones.
Because no genuine dispute exists as to Hanoch’s defense-of-others justification, and because she is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, Hanoch’s Motion for Summary Judgment shall be granted, and she shall have fourteen days to file a petition for “reasonable expenses” under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8340.2.
In an earlier decision, Judge Beetlestone rejected León’s defamation claim against Hanoch as well, on the strength of the state Commissioner’s “factual findings … essential to his decision to issue the PFA order”:
León … he states that “the issue of defamation and the additional torts were not decided with the Delaware Court’s entry of the” PFA order. While true, this is entirely beside the point. Issue preclusion bars “relitigation of issues actually litigated and determined in the prior suit, regardless of whether it was based on the same cause of action as the second suit.” It is thus of no moment that that the PFA proceedings did not specifically involve a claim for defamation; what matters is the Commissioner’s finding that León abused Goodman, a finding that was necessary to his decision to grant her PFA petition….
[T]he factual findings of the Commissioner’s PFA order make short work of León’s defamation claim. Defamation stems from a false statement of fact, and in Pennsylvania, a plaintiff’s complaint must “on its face must specifically identify what allegedly defamatory statements were made by whom and to whom.” Smith v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 112 F.Supp.2d 417, 429 (E.D. Pa. 2000). Here, the allegedly defamatory statements identified in the Second Amended Complaint fall into three general categories. First, León alleges that after their altercation in December 2022, Hanoch and Goodman falsely informed their employer that he had “engaged in inappropriate conduct toward Goodman.” Second, he alleges that shortly thereafter, Goodman and Hanoch filed a police report and PFA petition which against pressed these false accusations. (Included in this category are León’s allegations that Defendants continued to republish these statements by repeating them in various filings submitted in this matter.) And third, he alleges that Hanoch and Goodman filed a defamatory complaint with the New Jersey state bar which “included statements about Plaintiff’s character that were false when made.”
But the factual assertation at the core of each of these allegedly defamatory statements is that León had abused Goodman. And the PFA order found that this is exactly what happened. As explained, the Commissioner concluded Goodman and Hanoch’s account of what transpired between them and León credible, that León’s account was largely uncredible, and that León committed acts of abuse within the meaning of the Delaware Family Code. In other words, the Commissioner found that the statements that León maintains were defamatory were true. That finding is fatal to León’s defamation claim since falsity is an essential element of the tort…
Amy Epstein Gluck and Benjamin K. jacobs (Pierson Ferdinand LLP) represent Hanoch.
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